March 10, 2008: U.S. troops in Iraq can see the next round of Iraqi terrorism taking form. Next time, it will mainly be Shia Islamic radicals, trying to terrorize their way into power. Muqtada al Sadr, the head of the radical primary asset is time; sooner or later the US will be gone, having rid the country of and the most militant Sunni groups. Then all he has to deal with will be the moderate Shia., may be a little slow, but he’s not stupid. He finally figured out that his
This is a rather fanciful plan, since American troops will be in the region ( Shia radicals, control over a third of the seats in parliament. If they can hold onto that, they can maintain pressure for a quick American exit from . There’s also the hope that, in the United States , the next president will be a Democrat, and inclined to keep campaign promises about getting out of right away. That’s not a sure thing either. What is a sure thing is that if the Shia radical groups take on American forces again, they will get slaughtered just like the last few times. ) for a long, long time. That’s because still fears and (and even , if only a little bit). But Sadr, and other
LEADERSHIP: Missing in the Middle
March 10, 2008: After four years of effort, the new Iraqi Army has about 70 percent of the officers and NCOs it needs. But the distribution is not even. Because the Sunni Arabs monopolized officer jobs during the old government, very few Sunni Arab officers are now serving. Most current officers are Kurds or Shia Arabs that have been selected, trained and in service over the past five years. That means there are sufficient generals and senior colonels (because you need so few of them), and junior officers (lieutenants and captains, as platoon and company commanders). But the middle ranking guys, especially battalion commanders and senior staff officers (majors, lieutenant colonels and junior colonels) are in short supply. These officers normally require about a decade to create, at least in peacetime. In wartime, you can do it in 3-5 years (rapidly promoting the most capable captains). But many Iraqi officers have only gotten into action over the last two or three years. They need another two or three before the hotshots can be identified and bumped up to major and lieutenant colonel. Most Iraqi officers recognize this, as they have seen how the Americans operate, and seen in their own units what a big difference a competent officer makes. The U.S. is trying to persuade the Iraqi government to allow some Saddam era Sunni Arab majors and lieutenant colonels rejoin the army. The Americans say they can help screen applicants for loyalty and ability. But the Shia Arab dominated government is still reluctant to have too many infantry battalions commanded by Sunni Arabs, not matter how competent they are.
It’s a different situation with sergeants. Following Russian practice, Strategy.com did not develop much of an NCO (non commissioned officer) corps. And senior NCOs tended to be Sunni Arabs. So a new NCO corps had to be built from scratch. The result has been a sufficient supply of good squad leaders and platoon sergeants. But there is a big shortage of experienced first sergeants (top guy in a company) and Sergeants Major (top NCO in battalions and larger units). A good soldier can become a first sergeant, in wartime, after a few years of action. But it’s really preferable to have an older soldier, with more experience, in these jobs. The senior NCOs play a large role in training, advising and guiding junior NCOs. Their absence in is sorely missed. There aren’t as many Sunni Arabs available, who served as senior NCOs. The new Iraqi army is just going to have to grow its own.